

Non-Military Defense against Proxy War in Indonesia; A Conceptual Review

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Abstract—This study aims to formulate the conception of non-military defense in Indonesia, particularly in ministries, institutions and local governments in the fight against Proxy War. Data was collected through a literature study with data analysis using a model of implementation analysis framework and explained descriptively qualitatively. The results showed that the conception of Non-Military Defense must correlate between military defense, non-military defense, and proxy war with the "theory of defense quadrant" and "theory of defense window" and their strategies in anticipating and overcoming non-military threats of proxy war. This Non-Military Defense Conception is formulated with 3 strategies including enhancing defense human resources, developing regulations and cooperation between ministries and institutions, and implementing National Alertness. The implication of this conception requires the involvement of ministries and non-defense state institutions and regional governments.

Keywords—The conception, non-military defense, ministries, institutions and local governments, the theory of defense quadrant, the theory of defense window, proxy war.

I. INTRODUCTION

War conceptually is a term that refers to the type of soft war that one country is waging against another country through a third party, indirectly [1]. Proxy war carries an international agenda that is hidden from certain countries towards other target countries [2]–[5]. Various cases that occur in the world mostly caused by increased conflicts between countries through proxy war such as cases in Syria [6]–[9], Saudi Arab [6], [8], Yemen [10], Lybia [11], Iran [6], [10], [10], [12], and Africa [13]. Hidden problems are usually [13], [14].

Proxy war is intended to change the mindset, life, and perspective of the target community, which leads to asymmetries warfare, the threat of war from those who are stronger in political, economic, cultural, and military power against weaker parties [4], [7], [15]. This case then leads a country to use a proxy war strategy, a non-military threat to weaken an opponent without having to fight directly [15]. Proxy war, theoretically used to weaken the life of the nation and state such as ideology, politics, economics, social culture, military, and so on [1]. As a result, the sovereignty and integrity of the state becomes weak and easy to master [16]. One of the countries in Southeast Asia that has significant potential to be a proxy war target by other countries for political and economic interests is Indonesia. The abundance of natural resources is a source of triggers for other countries to be involved in the struggle for power within.

Regarding strategies against proxies, the government, through the Republic of Indonesia's Ministry of Defense,

issued strategic guidelines for non-military defense. This guideline is intended to provide strategic directions for defense stakeholders in dealing with non-military threats from other countries through proxy war attacks. However, this guideline is still not used as a whole as a guideline in dealing with non-military threats in various Indonesian government agencies. As a result, Indonesia's non-military defense (especially in all Ministries, Institutions and Regional Governments) is still general and not directed. Ideally, there is an applicative conception of Non-Military Defense whose implementation is integrated by all government agencies.

This study is significantly crucial since it is related to the planning and preparation of non-military defense strategies in dealing with proxy war which requires carefulness to not be late to handle it. Therefore, there is a need for in-depth research to deal with current and future proxy wars in order to formulate the latest non-military defense conceptions in order to safeguard national sovereignty, territorial integrity of the Unitary State of the Republic of Indonesia and the safety of all Indonesians. This study presents a solution to the weaknesses or shortcomings of implementing non-military defense in Indonesia in the face of a proxy war. This article is a continuation of an article in the previous edition of the journal entitled "Proxy War; Implementation of Non-Military Defense in Indonesia". This study is aimed at producing a non-military conception of defense ministries, institutions and local governments facing a proxy war.

II. RESEARCH FRAMEWORK

To formulate the conception of non-military defense in ministries, institutions, and regional governments requires the results of data analysis of the implementation of non-military defense in ministries, institutions, and regional governments along with their supporting and inhibiting factors. The stages of formulating the conception use the Mazmanian and Sabatier analysis framework models [17] as shown below.

III. METHOD

This type of research is exploratory research that identifies or explores important aspects for Non-military Defense against the Proxy War threat. The study was conducted in 2018 and 2019 in the Jakarta Special Capital Region (DKI) and surrounding areas including Central Jakarta, South Jakarta, East Jakarta and Bogor. One reason is that Jakarta is the capital of the State of Indonesia and the Government Center. Meanwhile, Bogor is a buffer of the capital. Data collected in the form of primary and secondary data. Primary

data obtained through interviews and observations, while secondary data obtained through research files related to research. Data in this study were obtained from several sources, including informants, events and documents. Data were analyzed descriptively.



Fig. 1. A Conceptual framework of non-military defense in Indonesia.

IV. RESULT AND DISCUSSION

A. Causality of Non-military Defense Conception Against Proxy War

Ministries, non-defense institutions, in addition to carrying out their main duties and functions, have also sought to counter non-military threats that arise. However, the non-military defense carried out has not yet referred to and is guided by Law Number 3 of 2002 concerning National Defense and its derivatives. In addition, basically the Indonesian Ministry of Defense has carried out maximum efforts in the field of National Defense until the issuance of the Republic of Indonesia's Decree number 19 of 2016 concerning Non-military Strategic Defense Guidelines. In this case, the Ministry of Defense of the Republic of Indonesia has cooperated and synergized with Ministries and non-defense institutions and has carried out the socialization of the Non-Military Defense Strategic Guidebook to representatives of each of the Ministries and Institutions invited. However, in its implementation, Non-Military Defense conducted by Ministries, Institutions and Local Government has not been implemented optimally. It is because Ministries and Non-Defense Institutions have not referred to the Non-Military Defense Strategic Guidelines issued by the Ministry of Defense of the Republic of Indonesia. This is because: 1) the main tasks and functions of the Presidential Regulation of each Ministry / non-defense institution have not included the National Defense field as a consideration based on the Presidential Regulation; 2) Many officials who do not understand National Defense are non-military threats. As a result, Non-military Defense is still weak and not optimal in

its implementation. The foregoing can be proven using theory of defense quadrant and theory of defense window.

B. The Theory of Defense Quadrant

The basis of this theory is the Presidential authority in the selection of defense priorities in order to strengthen military defense or strengthen non-military defenses that are within the authority of the President. The choice of defense priority can be visualized in the quadrant below:




Fig. 2. The Theory of Defense Quadrant

Inf.:

MD = Military Defense

NMD = Non-Military Defense

The results of this study reinforce the concept of national defense adopted by the Republic of Indonesia, that National Defense consists of Military Defense and Non-Military Defense. Thus, there is a correlation between non-military defense and military defense. A weak non-military defense can affect national defense.

C. Theory of Defense Window

If examined further, the quadrants can find out the correlation between Military Defense and Non-Military Defense and their impact on the threat of Proxy War. This can be illustrated in the following table:

TABLE 1. The Theory of Defense Window

Defense		Non-Military	
		Strong	Weak
Military	Strong	Proxy War Decreased	Proxy War Increased
	Weak	Proxy War Decreased	Proxy War Increased

The picture shows that if Non-Military Defense weakens, Proxy War tends to increase. However, on the contrary, if the Non-military Defense strengthens, the Proxy War tends to weaken. In addition, if Military Defense is weak, it does not necessarily make Proxy War strengthen. This shows that Non-military Defense has a more important role than just relying on strong Military Defense. The President's choice of defense priorities influences the strength of the proxy war in a country.

Regarding proxy war [14], [18], it can weaken a country by not fighting against its military power, but through the highest leadership of the state or institution, executive, judiciary and legislature, the concept of the Non-Military Defense quadrant and the theory of defense windows is to become relevant

D. Strategy against Proxy War

A strategy for dealing with the strengths and weaknesses of proxy war can be shown in the following table:

TABLE 2. The Strategy against proxy war

Quadrant	Proxy War Threats	Strategy
Quadrant I Strong MD, Strong NMD (MD +, NMD+)	Proxy War Decreased (PW-)	Maintain stability of military defense and non-military defense
Quadrant II Strong MD, Weak NMD (MD +, NMD-)	Proxy War Increased (PW+)	Maintain military defense and Improve non-military defense
Quadrant III Weak MD, Strong NMD (MD-, NMD+)	Proxy War Decreased (PW-)	Maintain non-military defense and Improve military defense
Quadrant IV Weak MD, Strong NMD (MD -, NMD -)	Proxy War Increased (PW+)	Improve military defense and non- military defense

From the facts and findings, relating to the 1945 Constitution of the Republic of Indonesia, the Law on National Defense and Presidential Regulations which are designated ministries or non-defense institutions, there are 3 responsive forms of ministries or institutions in addressing Non-military Defense tasks, as shown in table 1:

TABLE 3. Implementation of non-military defense in ministries and non-defense institutions based on legislations

Implementation of ministries and non-defense institutions to Non-Military Defense Regulations	The basic Laws on Non-Military Defense			Inf.
	UUD 1945	The Laws of National defense and dan Non-military Defense Strategic Guidelines	Presidential Regulations	
Implementation 1	√	√	√	Ideal
Implementation 2	√	√	-	Non-Ideal
Implementation 3	√	-	-	Non-Ideal

This non-ideal condition must be idealized by the process of harmonizing the law, with the main objective being to include Non-Military Defense activities in their main tasks and functions.

E. The Recommendations for Non-military Defense Conception Frameworks against Proxy War Threats

Non-military defense conceptions are non-military defense systems for ministries and non-defense institutions and local governments. The system has the following advantages; a) Non-military Defense System is made per Ministry / Institution based on non-military threats faced by each Ministry / Institution so that it is more applicable, b) Non-Military Defense System is based on the 1945 Constitution of the Republic of Indonesia and its derivatives and is a translation of the Strategic Defense Guidelines Non-military issues issued by the Indonesian Ministry of Defense, to avoid

legal disharmony, c) Non-military defense systems can be further elaborated into making Contingency Plans and Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs) in accordance with the implementers and targets to be achieved.

F. The Stages of Realizing the Concept of Non-Military Defense in Ministries and Institutions Against Proxy War

To make this conception workable and operational, it needs to start with the formulation of a macro conception. The formulation of the conception is like "Implementation of Non-military Defense through enhancing defense Human Resources (HR), strengthening Regulations and Cooperation, and implementing National Precautions against proxy war".

The formulation of the conception is still general in nature, and thus needs to be elaborated in strategic steps. In 3 existing strategies, the steps are outlined into 10 efforts that need to be implemented such as: 1) First Strategy, increasing defense human resources by conducting socialization related to national defense and threats, adding material on state defense and national defense in leadership education, involving officials in Lemhannas education, and also assigning officials to participate in defense education at the master and doctoral level; 2) Second Strategy, strengthening regulations and cooperation by revising presidential regulations on ministries and non-military institutions, and increasing cooperation and synergy between ministries and State institutions; and 3) Third Strategy, implementing national vigilance by predicting non-military threats in the future, making contingency plans for non-military defense, compiling Non-military Defense SOPs, and carrying out non-military defense simulations.

Based on the analytical framework model of Mazmanian and Sabatier [17], the framework of the conception of non-military defense recommended to ministries, institutions and local governments is shown in the following figure.




Fig. 3. The conceptual framework for non-military defense against proxy war

Three strategies and ten efforts in the conception of non-

military defense that need to be carried out by ministries, non-defense institutions and local governments are as follows.

A. *First Strategy; Increasing Defense Human Resources by;*

1. *Conducting socialization related to national defense and threats*

The Indonesian Ministry of Defense is responsible for the national defense sector by providing socialization about national defense, specifically regarding non-military defense and its threats. The national defense socialization program was held for all ministries, non-defense institutions and local governments. The participants are expected to come from echelon II / III officials, Assistant officials and Head of Offices in the Regional Government.

2. *Adding material on state defense and national defense in leadership education*

Leadership education material is more directed to debriefing in the field of expertise or profession and effective and efficient leadership patterns. Meanwhile, material on leadership aimed at the interests of national defense is not included. Therefore, national defense and state defense materials need to be provided at every level of Leadership Education. Leaders as decision makers are expected to make decisions that prioritize the interests of the country and provide benefits to the community. Understanding, attitude and mentality Officials in ministries, institutions and regional government towards national defense and national defense are very important, because they are one of the targets of proxy war, especially proxy war with economic motives. Craig [13] revealed that one way to destroy a country is by influencing its leaders. For defense material, it should be guided by RI Law Number 3 of 2002 concerning National Defense and its derivatives, and Impres Number 7 of 2018 concerning National Defense Action Plans.

3. *Involving officials in Lemhannas (National Resilience Institute) education*

National Resilience Institute (Lemhannas) is a Non-Ministerial Government Institution whose job is to carry out education of leaders at the national level and strategic studies related to National Resilience and the strengthening of national values. In order for ministerial and institutional officials to understand National Defense, they need to be included, especially those serving in echelon 1 and echelon 2 to participate in defense education at Lemhannas. It is intended that leaders in ministries and non-defense institutions better understand the challenges of the National Doctrine on National Defense and specifically Non-Military Defense. This National Doctrine is a provision for officials to lead their institutions, in order to implement Non-military Defense.

4. *Assigning officials to participate in defense education at the master and doctoral level*

Regarding National Defense, ministries and agencies need to formulate a non-military defense policy, so professional human resources are needed, who understand National Defense including Non-Military Defense. At the University, currently, there is a Masters and Doctoral education level that

offers defense studies, one of the ways that ministries and institutions can take is to send staff to study. Graduates are expected to be able to become Defense Strategic Planning Expert Staff in each ministry and institution, to implement Non-Military Defense.

B. *Second Strategy: Strengthening regulations and cooperation by;*

1. *Revising presidential regulations on ministries and non-military institutions*

Non-military defense in ministries and non-defense institutions is still not optimally implemented. This is due to: a) the lack of understanding of officials in the field of defense, b) the existence of a legal vacuum which is a disharmony of laws in the Presidential Regulation for ministries and institutions. Therefore, it is necessary to harmonize the law in the Presidential Regulation through revision by adding the main tasks and functions related to Non-military Defense.

This was initiated by the Minister of Defense of the Republic of Indonesia to propose a review and revision of the Presidential Regulation on Ministries and non-defense institutions through a letter to the Minister of Law and Human Rights of the Republic of Indonesia by first explaining the purpose and objectives as well as the reasons.

To overcome the disharmony of the Presidential Regulation for the ministries and institutions described above, Marwan [19] explains that there are three ways: a) Amending or revoking certain articles that are subject to disharmony or all articles of the relevant laws and regulations, by the authorized agency, b) Submitting a request for judicial review to the judiciary as follows: 1) the examination of the constitution is conducted in the Constitutional Court; and 2) examining of the statutory provisions under the law against the law carried out in the Supreme Court, c) Applying the principle or doctrine of the law "*Lex superior derogat legi inferiori, Lex specialis derogat legi generalis, and lex posterior derogat priori legori priori*".

The harmonization of law has two targets such as adding to the consideration of weighing points and adding clauses to the main tasks and functions, the Republic of Indonesia's Presidential Regulation on ministries and institutions. One example is the Republic of Indonesia's Presidential Regulation Number 63 Year 2015 concerning the Indonesian Ministry of Maritime Affairs and Fisheries as explained below:

- a. Adding RI Law Number 3 of 2002 concerning National Defense to the consideration points in view of the Presidential Regulation for the Indonesian Ministry of Maritime Affairs and Fisheries, namely Article 7 paragraph (3), Article 12 and Article 19 of Law Number 3 of 2002 concerning National Defense. The reason is because in general ministries and non-defense institutions are still not guided by Law Number 3 of 2002 concerning National Defense as the basis for implementing Non-military Defense in carrying out its main duties and functions.
- b. Adding the Non-Military Defense clause to the main tasks and functions of the Indonesian Ministry of Maritime Affairs and Fisheries, especially in Article 3

paragraph a, namely the formulation and determination of the Non-Military Defense system policy in the field of maritime affairs and fisheries. Next, paragraph b is the implementation of the policy in Non-military Defense in the field of maritime affairs and fisheries. The reason is because in general, the main tasks and functions as well as policies and regulations in ministries and non-defense institutions are still not related to the field of National Defense, one of which is Non-Military Defense, which should not only be interests in the sector itself but must link with greater and more comprehensive such as supporting the implementation of National Defense as the responsibility of a state institution in Indonesia. Therefore, in addition to being guided by and underpinning the 1945 Constitution in making basic tasks and functions as well as existing regulations, there is a need for additions and revisions that are adapted to RI Law Number 3 of 2002 concerning National Defense. This is intended so that all ministries and institutions outside the existing defense sector can understand and implement the implementation of non-military defense optimally.

2. *Increasing cooperation and synergy between ministries and State institutions*

In general, ministry partners and non-defense institutions are inadequate when used for the implementation of the Non-military Defense they face. This is because partners are only available for basic tasks and functions. These partners will be very useful in the implementation of Non-military Defense carried out by ministries and non-defense institutions as the main element. Because these partners will be supporting components that can be invited to work together and synergize in dealing with non-military threats, especially proxy wars, both today and in the future.

C. *Third Strategy: Implementing national vigilance by:*

1. *Predicting non-military threats in the future*

There is a process of selecting the main actions in the formulation of strategy, one of which is identifying external opportunities and threats and determining internal strengths and weaknesses. One of the National Precautions that can be done by ministries and non-defense institutions is by predicting non-military threats which are believed to occur in the following year. The implementation in predicting non-military threats is aimed at anticipating non-military threats that might occur in the future in order to support national vigilance that needs to be prepared as early as possible by ministries and non-defense institutions and the Regional Government.

2. *Making contingency plans for non-military defense*

Steiner in [14] explains that the basic purpose of contingency planning is to put managers in a better position so that they can handle unexpected developments, than if they don't make preparations. Formulation of contingency plans for ministries and institutions as well as regional governments must be planned, integrated, comprehensive, and applicable by

prioritizing the real power in ministries and institutions, and can synergize and integrate with other supporting elements. The implementation of Non-military Defense Contingency Plans in ministries and non-defense institutions aims to prevent and / or overcome non-military threats, especially proxy wars, which may occur at any time in the future to support National Precautions that need to be prepared as early as possible.

3. *Compiling Non-military Defense SOPs*

After the completion of the contingency plan preparation, the next step for the ministries and agencies to carry out the preparation of the Standard Operating Procedure (SOP) in the implementation of the contingency plan that has been made. The formulation of this SOP is intended so that the process of carrying out the tasks to be carried out can run in an orderly and systematic manner from beginning to end in order to achieve optimal results as expected. Then, in the preparation of the SOP, ministries and institutions which are the main elements and other elements as supporters must coordinate and cooperate. Because this concerns the main tasks of each institution, in its implementation, there must be no collisions or overlaps between agencies so that they can be carried out safely, smoothly, in an orderly and optimal manner.

4. *Performing non-military defense simulations*

To convince and strengthen the Contingency Plan and SOP that have been prepared previously, it is necessary to conduct simulation exercises by ministries and non-defense institutions as the main elements and their supporting elements including the Ministry of Defense of the Republic of Indonesia which is the supervision of the defense sector. The simulation exercise was carried out with the intention of practicing the contents of the Contingency Plan and SOPs that had been made previously. The aim is to improve the weaknesses or shortcomings that have been found in the simulation exercise through evaluation after the exercise is carried out. This simulation exercise is carried out indoors, with a variety of exercises used in the form of case studies of a problem in accordance with emerging threats.

V. CONCLUSION

Indonesia does not yet have a standard and applicative Non-military Defense Conception against the Proxy War for ministries, institutions and local governments. The formulation of the Non-Military Defense Conception is "The implementation of Non-Military Defense through enhancing defense Human Resources (HR), strengthening regulation and cooperation, and implementing national vigilance against the Proxy War". The conception is a system and is described in documents and a series of activities. The document is a development of the Non-Military Defense Strategic Guidebook published by the Indonesian Ministry of Defense. The formulation is supported by the theory of the defense quadrant, the theory of the defense window, and strategies in Dealing with Proxy War.

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