

Proxy War; The Implementation of Non-Military Defense in Indonesia

Ardiansyah Triono, Marjono, Moeljadi, Tjahjanulin Domai

Defense Studies, Brawijaya University, Malang, Indonesia

Email: ardiansyah[DOT]triono[DOT]19[AT]gmail[DOT]com

Abstract—Proxy war has become a new form of the phenomenon of international conflict that has emerged in the world. National resilience to the existence of a proxy war should be one of the most vital concerns for a country. This study aims to explore the implementation of non-military defense, supporting factors, and inhibiting factors that arise by non-Ministry of Defense against proxy war in Indonesia. This study used a qualitative approach by data collection techniques through in-depth interviews at 6 Ministries, 3 State Institutions, and 1 Local Government. Data were analyzed using the interactive model of Miles, Huberman and Saldana. This research found that ministries or non-defense state institutions and local governments have different conceptions of proxy war and are also not optimal in their Non-Military Defense implementation. This study also showed that the supporting factors consist of professionalism of human resources, regulation of National Defense, Cooperation, and synergy. Meanwhile, the inhibiting factor consists of the lack of official understanding of the national defense, the main tasks and functions not related to national defense, and the lack of national vigilance. To optimize the implementation of non-military defense, it is needed the socialization of non-military defense and its threats, harmonization of laws and regulations at each Ministry and Institution, and the implementation of national vigilance.

Keywords— Non-Military defense, Non-Military threats, Proxy war, national defense, national vigilance.

I. INTRODUCTION

Throughout human history, war, both physical and non-physical, has become an inseparable part of human life in various countries of the world. In recent years, proxy war has become an issue that has emerged as one of the hidden international agendas [1]–[4]. Increased conflicts through proxies can be easily found in various countries in the world such as Syria [5]–[8], Saudi Arabia [5], [7], Yemen [9], Libya [10], Iran [5], [9], [9], [11], and Africa [12]. In general, ulterior motives relate to issues of power, sovereignty, and economic interests [12], [13].

Proxy war refers to the use of soft power with the aim of changing the mindset, lifestyle, and perspective of the target community in which it creates asymmetric warfare, a war between unequal parties [3], [6], [14]. This asymmetrical war led to the use of proxy war strategy which is a non-military threat to weaken the opponent without having to fight directly [14]. Proxy war, unlike war with physical contact, attacks on various aspects of national and state life such as ideology, politics, economy, social culture, military, etc. [15]. One of the effects of a proxy war attack is to damage the sovereignty and integrity of the target country [16]. Indonesia as a big country in Southeast Asia is of course also the target of proxy warfare by other countries for political and economic interests.

The diversity of natural resource wealth such as food, mining, energy, water, forests, and the sea is a source of attraction for foreign countries to control Indonesia through a proxy war. Therefore, various threats are expected to occur in the future such as the food crisis, energy crisis, water crisis and climate change caused by exploited forests and seas. The motives of the proxy war include power, sovereignty and the economy [12]. Government power is one of the most effective entry points to weaken the country's sovereignty and obtain material benefits through the control of Indonesia's economic resources.

To deal with non-military threats (proxy war), Indonesia has issued Act No. 3/2002 on national defense and presidential regulation No. 97/2015 on Indonesia's general defense policy 2015-2019. Furthermore, the regulation is elaborated in regulation of the minister of defense of the Republic of Indonesia Number 19/2015 regarding the implementation of national defense, which states that the ministry or state institution has the duty to deal with non-military threats (Kemenhan, 2015b; Kemenkumham, 2015). This task is an additional task besides the main task and function of each ministry and state institution.

The acts and other regulations show that the mandate of national defense is not only directed at the ministry of defense, but is also directed at ministries or non-military institutions and local governments. However, the implementation of non-military defense by various non-Indonesian ministry of defense institutions is currently being questioned. This can be seen from the various facts of the emergence of separatist movements, radicalism, terrorism, high drug cases, and fish theft [19]–[21]. Therefore, this study aims to comprehensively study the implementation of non-military defense by non-military ministries, institutions, and local governments in dealing with proxy war in Indonesia. In addition, this study will also describe the supporting and inhibiting factors in the implementation of non-military defense.

II. METHOD

This study used an exploratory approach to identify proxy war threats by exploring important aspects for non-military defense and describing the results of certain variables, symptoms or circumstances in dealing with the research objectives [22]. The study was conducted in the Jakarta Special Capital Region (DKI) and surrounding areas including Central Jakarta, South Jakarta, East Jakarta and Bogor. Data were obtained using in-depth interviews with informants from 6 Ministries (Ministry of Defense, Ministry of Home Affairs,

Ministry of Maritime Affairs and Fisheries, Ministry of Agriculture, Ministry of Trade, Ministry of Education and Culture), 3 State Institutions (National Counterterrorism Agency, National Narcotics Agency, and Siberian Agency and State Code), and 1 Regional Government (DKI Jakarta). Then, the data were analyzed using an interactive analysis model includes data collection, data display, data condensation, and data conclusion [23], as shown below.




Fig. 1. Interactive model for Data analysis

III. RESULTS

A. The Implementation of Non-Military Defense

The non-military Defense implementation data was obtained from 6 Ministries and 3 Institutions which were used as informants including the Indonesian Ministry of Defense, the Indonesian Ministry of Internal Affairs, the Ministry of Agriculture, the Ministry of Maritime Affairs and Fisheries, the Ministry of Trade, the Ministry of Education and Culture, the National Agency for the Counter Terrorism, National Narcotics Agency, Siber Agency and State Code. Of the 6 Ministries and 3 Institutions in general showed almost the same findings even though the fields are different.

The main tasks and functions of all Ministries and Institutions are as follows: (a) formulating, establishing and implementing policies, (b) Coordinating, (c) coaching; (d) managing assets, and (e) supervising, adjusted to their respective fields. None of the main tasks and functions are related to the field of defense in accordance with act No. 3 of 2002 concerning national defense.

Threats faced by ministries and institutions outside the defense sector are ideology (radicalism, terrorism, separatism), politics (Election and Presidential Election in 2014 and 2019), economy (fish theft at sea), social culture (drug trafficking and abuse), art, and food), technology (cyber-attacks, hackers, and hoaxes), and legislation (planning and making of the Criminal Code and KPK in 2019), etc.

The regulation used as the basis for consideration of the highest Presidential, Ministry and Institutional Regulations is the 1945 Constitution of the Republic of Indonesia. In addition, the main tasks and functions are not related to the defense sector. Whereas in Act Number 3 of 2002 concerning National Defense in Article 7 paragraph (3), it is clear that the national defense system in the face of non-military threats places non-defense government institutions as the main elements, based on the form and nature of the threats faced which are supported by other elements of nation's strength.

The logical reason is that national defense is not only the task of the Indonesian Ministry of Defense, the TNI and the Police officer.

Efforts and strategies that have been implemented by ministries or non-military institutions are by issuing policies in the form of regulations, socialization activities, coordination, cooperation and synergy, spreading information all of which are only based on their respective main tasks and functions and are not related to existing defense legislation. Although there are some ministries that have tried to carry out non-military defense, they do not refer to non-military strategic defense guidelines such as the Ministry of Maritime Affairs and Fisheries, the National Counterterrorism Agency, and the National Narcotics Agency.

Meanwhile, for the implementation of Non-military Defense by the regional government of DKI Jakarta Province, the main tasks and functions are in accordance with the vision and mission and the Work Program of the Governor and Deputy Governor for the 2017-2022 Period.

The threats have been faced by the governance are drug trafficking and abuse, brawls between students or residents, pornography or prostitution, illegal alcohol circulation, hoax (fake news), SARA issues or conflicts, labor demonstrations, and human rights violations. Meanwhile, the regulations used in addition to the Pancasila and the 1945 Constitution are the Governor or Regional Secretary Instruction and the Regional Work Unit (SKPD) Program or the Regional Implementation Unit (UPD). They always make appeals or activities that are educative, informative, and applicable. Efforts and strategies undertaken are through socialization, closed monitoring, coordination, and consultation with the Integrated Social Conflict Handling Team.

B. Supporting and Inhibiting Factors of Non-Military Defense Implementation

Some Supporting Factors in Implementing Non-military Defense of ministries or state institutions include ministerial regulation policies, coordination, cooperation between agencies, the support of media, society and other agencies, rich natural resources, and professional human resources. Whereas, the inhibiting factor consists of the delay in early detection, the low quality of human resources, the lack of personnel and means of transportation. In addition, inequality between regions in the field of facilities and infrastructure, difficulty in coordination between ministries or institutions and local governments, the presence of radicalism and terrorism, a growing drug network, and the weakness of border areas, also become very significant obstacles in the implementation of Non-military Defense in Indonesia.

Supporting Factors in the Implementation of the Non-Military Defense of the Jakarta Regional Government include heterogeneous, knowledgeable and logical, metropolis, and people who have easy access in various fields. Meanwhile, the inhibiting factor consists of the presumption or perception of individuals or groups of people who still think that proxy war is an engineering to lead public opinion that does not agree with Government policy.

IV. DISCUSSION

A. *The Implementation of Non-military Defense by Ministries and Institutions Against proxy war in Indonesia*

In terms of the laws and regulations used by the Ministries and non-defense institutions, in general, they only use the 1945 Constitution, the Republic of Indonesia Law, and Government or President Regulations that are used as the basis for carrying out their main duties and functions. It is known that Act No. 3 of 2002 concerning National Defense in Article 7 paragraph (3) states that the National Defense System in the face of non-military threats places government institutions outside the field of defense as the main element based on the form and nature of the threats faced. However, in its implementation, at present, ministries or non-defense institutions have not carried out optimally. The reason is because the defense laws and regulations are not used as a reference or guide in implementing Non-military Defense. As a result, this can endanger the country's sovereignty and the territorial integrity of the Unitary Republic of Indonesia and National Defense.

Meanwhile, in terms of the main tasks and functions in ministries and institutions there are 5 aspects in common from the contents of each main task and function such as (1) formulation, determination, and implementation of policies, (2) coordination, (3) coaching, (4) asset management, and (5) supervision. These 5 aspects are the guidelines of each ministry or institution in carrying out its main tasks and functions in accordance with their respective fields as mentioned in the Republic of Indonesia's Presidential Regulation which regulates the Ministries and Institutions of the Republic of Indonesia.

In general, the main tasks and functions of the Ministries and Institutions are to concentrate and focus on the success in achieving performance targets in their respective fields and have not yet led to activities related to national defense. In fact, ministries or institutions outside the field of defense are the implementers of non-military defense in the face of proxy war in their respective agencies. If the meaning of National Defense is not included in the main tasks, functions and regulations issued by ministries or state institutions, then their understanding of Non-Military Defense and non-military threats, especially proxy war, is considered low. As a result, Non-military Defense will be difficult to implement. The impact will be able to threaten the country's sovereignty and the territorial integrity of the Unitary Republic of Indonesia and National Defense.

Non-military threats that exist in ministries or non-defense institutions, in general, are threats that are already associated with proxy warfare. However, because these threats seem mediocre and often occur every year, the way to deal with them is only to use actions based on the main tasks, functions, and regulations that exist in these agencies. Because ministries and non-defense institutions do not yet understand the non-military threat, especially the proxy war, they do not associate the threat with the existing Non-military Defense. Ministries and non-defense institutions should be as alert as possible to anticipate and anticipate these threats and must not

underestimate them. Because, if they wait until the threat of proxy war occurs, it is difficult to ward off and overcome it. Non-military threats exist in ministries or institutions related to their respective fields. In fact, if there is a threat, in general, they immediately overcome it without the help of other parties.

The efforts carried out by several ministries or institutions currently only refer to and are guided by their main tasks and functions. They have not linked with what is mandated by Law number 3 of 2002 concerning National Defense. This is caused by their lack of understanding about the presence of non-military threats in the form of proxy war or the existence of a non-military strategic defense guidebook. Existing ministries or institutions seem to only overcome an obstacle or obstacle to their main tasks and functions. If this is the case, then non-military threats, especially in the form of proxy war will become increasingly vulnerable. Because, the core cause of the threat is not detected early and anticipated beforehand.

B. *Implementation of Non-military Defense of Local Governments against Proxy war in Indonesia*

The Provincial Government of DKI Jakarta in implementing non-military defense to deal with non-military threats only uses the Governor or Regional Secretary's Instruction. In particular the Provincial Government of DKI Jakarta and in general the Regional Government does not implement Non-Military Defense. Because, in the Republic of Indonesia's Minister of Defense Regulation No. 19 of 2016 concerning the Strategic Guidelines for non-military Defense explains that the Regional Government is actually just another element of the nation's power that acts as a supporter to the ministries and state institutions. In addition, RI Law No. 23 of 2014 concerning Regional Government explains that the Regional Government is tasked with only carrying out general government affairs, for absolute government affairs such as the defense sector carried out by the Central Government, Ministries and State Institutions.

The existence of each Regional Government must have and carry out the main tasks and functions mandated to it. In Law Number 23 of 2014 concerning Regional Government, the implementation of its duties is divided into 2 including general government affairs and concurrent. In Concurrent Government Affairs, the Regional Government has mandatory tasks and choices from the Central Government. However, for General Government Affairs, it is the government matter which becomes the authority of the President as the Head of State, one of which is that contained in Article 25 Paragraph (1) letter b concerning the Development of Unity and National Unity carried out by the Governor responsible to the President through the Minister. Meanwhile, the Regent or Mayor is responsible to the Minister through the governor as a representative of the Central Government. From this explanation, it can be seen that the Regional Government is a helper and supporter of the Central Government, including in the field of defense, especially the implementation of Non-military Defense such as proxy war.

This study found that in the DKI Jakarta region indirectly these non-military threats, especially proxy war, have been felt

in the capital city of Jakarta such as the circulation and abuse of drugs, hoaks (fake news), issues or conflicts of SARA (ethnicity, religion, race, and class), demonstrations from the people of Papua who ask for independence and others. Jakarta City is the Power of Gravity from Indonesia. Therefore, many non-military threats occur in the city of Jakarta ranging from the fields of ideology, politics, economics, social culture, technology and so forth. This is because Jakarta as the Republic of Indonesia's capital city is the center of government and representatives of other countries as well as the center of trade and business. Besides that, there are also many people from various regions, tribes, races and religions from all parts of Indonesia, so that non-military threats, especially proxy war, will always appear in all aspects of life in order to undermine the authority of the Indonesian government.

In the implementation of facing non-military threats, especially proxy war, by the Provincial Government of DKI Jakarta, it is carried out through the Instructions of the governor or Regional Secretary by making appeals or activities that are educative, informative and applicable. The aim is for the community to create and maintain a conducive atmosphere in the capital city of Jakarta through three pillars including councils, forums and teams. Actually, in the existing legislation, the Regional Government in its affairs and duties in the field of defense is not an obligation. They are only as supporting components of the Central Government in implementing the defense field of proxy war. The description of the Non-military Defense of DKI Jakarta in dealing with the threat of proxy war is also a picture of several provincial, regency or city governments throughout Indonesia.

C. Supporting and Inhibiting Factors of the Implementation of Non-Military Defense Against Proxy War

From ministries, institutions, and regional governments, in general, several supporting and inhibiting factors were identified that are equally faced in efforts to deal with non-military threats. The several supporting factors consist of;

1. Professional Human Resources

The officials or employees in the ministries, institutions, and local governments, are now very adequate when faced with the times and the current developing situation. Human resources that are owned, in general, have come from bachelor graduates. In dealing with problems that arise they should be able to handle them well, moreover supported by senior officials who are experienced in their respective fields. With the existence of professional human resources, it should also be able to overcome problems that are non-military threats in defending their country, if they know and understand National Defense.

2. Regulation on National Defense

In the field of defense, the Indonesian State currently has regulations in the field of National Defense such as the 1945 Constitution of the Republic of Indonesia Number 3 of 2002 concerning National Defense and its derivatives which can be used as operational bases in the implementation of Military

Defense and Non-Military Defense. If the National Defense legislation and its derivatives are faced with a Presidential Regulation that regulates the main tasks and functions of ministries or non-defense institutions that are still unrelated, it means that there is a legal vacuum that results in legal uncertainty (*rechtsonzekerheid*) to legal chaos (*rechtsverwarring*). However, if the legal vacuum is harmonized through executive review to achieve legal certainty, the ministry or non-defense institution will be able to immediately implement non-military defense such as a proxy war in Indonesia.

3. The Guidebook of Non-military Defense Strategy

For non-military defense purposes carried out by ministries and non-defense institutions, the Non-Military Defense Strategic Guidelines book was published by the Indonesian Ministry of Defense. This will be able to support the implementation of non-military defense to face the threat of proxy war in Indonesia. Every ministry and institution can learn and know what is meant by non-military defense. This will build awareness and the same view of national defense. The book is sufficient and in detail describes the strategies and steps that need to be taken in order to build readiness in dealing with the threat of proxy war.

4. Synergy of ministries, institutions and local governments

The synergy of ministries, institutions, and regional governments has been very good, supported by sophisticated technological tools. This will be able to support the implementation of non-military defense in dealing with the proxy war. Good cooperation will have enormous strength when compared to without cooperation in overcoming the proxy war. In implementing non-military defense to overcome the threat of proxy war, it cannot be handled alone by the main element, the ministry of defense. However, it must be supported by other components in order to make a great and integrated strength. Finally, with integration and synergy, the implementation of non-military defense can be implemented optimally and the results can be maximized.

Meanwhile, the factors which become obstacles to the implementation of non-military defense against proxy war are as follows:

1. Lack of understanding among officials regarding Non-military Defense and non-military threats

In mastering their main duties and functions, officials in ministries and institutions outside the defense sector and regional governments are already professional, but in the knowledge of national defense, especially non-military defense and non-military threats, especially the emerging proxy war, is still lacking in understanding. Indeed, Nirmiliter Defense and non-military threats, especially proxy war, are still unknown. In other words, people are still unfamiliar with the term. In fact, it shows that there are no linkages in the field of defense that are included in the main tasks, functions, or regulations that have been issued by ministries, institutions, and local governments. In order for officials to understand

national defense, especially non-filter defense and its threats, it is necessary to disseminate knowledge about the field of defense. The implementation of the socialization should be carried out by the Indonesian Ministry of Defense, as the Leading Sector, by programming and budgeting the socialization activities to all ministries, institutions, and local government as soon as possible.

2. *There is no interrelation between the main tasks and functions and National Defense*

The main tasks, functions, regulations that exist in ministries, institutions outside the defense sector, and local government have nothing to do with the defense sector. They assume, that is not their job. However, this field of defense should be implemented starting from the individual level to groups and institutions including ministries, institutions and local government, relevant to the existing National Defense Law and its derivatives. This can be seen from not explaining explicitly in the main tasks and functions of the Ministries and Institutions and Regional Governments related to matters of a defense nature, including those that have been previously issued regulations. As a result, the duties and responsibilities in the defense sector that it carries are still not prioritized and even feel that they are not obliged to carry out, because the basic foundations on their main tasks and functions are not listed and not properly linked. If this continues in the future, Indonesia's national defense, especially against the proxy war phenomenon, will never be implemented by ministries, institutions and local government and it may be that non-military threats will continue to escalate and continue to undermine the authority of the existing government. To anticipate the overlap or vacuum of existing laws and regulations in ministries, institutions and local government, it is necessary to harmonize the law in the articles governing the main tasks and functions of ministries, institutions and local government.

3. *The lack of national vigilance towards proxy war*

The loopholes in attacks carried out by proxy war threats are very unlimited and difficult to stem. If this is paralleled by efforts to implement non-military defense by ministries, institutions, and local government, then the proxy war attack will worsen and endanger the life of the nation and state. To avoid this, national vigilance should be one alternative solution that must be closely guarded. Therefore, each ministry, institution, and local government must know what threats have been threatening their respective fields and subsequently what threats will threaten in the future. If the threat is known, ministries, institutions, and local government will be able to prepare and plan strategies and patterns to deal with the threats that will arise. In this case, national vigilance will be maintained and increased, all threats that will occur can be predicted and anticipated properly.

V. CONCLUSION

Ministries and non-defense institutions in dealing with the threat of proxy war are still oriented to their main tasks and functions. In addition, the regulations issued are not related to

non-military defense. Therefore, the implementation process is still not optimal. The implementation of Non-Military Defense carried out by the Regional Government in dealing with non-military threats in the region is quite good. Moreover, the implementation of non-military defense against proxy war in Indonesia can be carried out optimally if there are several factors that are reinforced and eliminated. Supporting factors that need to be strengthened include: 1) Professional Human Resources; 2) the existence of regulations on National Defense; 3) the existence of the Non-Military Defense Strategy Guidelines used as a reference; and 4) cooperation and synergy between ministries or institutions. In addition, the inhibiting factors that need to be eliminated include: 1) the presence of officials who do not understand Non-Military Defense and non-military threats; 2) The main tasks and functions are not related to National Defense; and 3) Lack of National Precautions according to their respective fields.

The Indonesian Ministry of Defense needs to immediately carry out socialization guidelines for non-military defense strategies to understand officials about non-military defense and the threat of proxy war. The Minister of Defense of the Republic of Indonesia needs to immediately recommend the Minister of Law and Human Rights of the Republic of Indonesia to harmonize the laws of the Presidential Regulation in each ministry and non-defense institution by including the non-military defense clause on their main duties and functions. Furthermore, ministries, institutions, and local government are expected to immediately implement national vigilance and be actively involved in defense against proxy war as early as possible based on their respective fields.

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